18.10.2022 - Richard Moore

In his recent book, Terrace (2019) argues that enculturated chimpanzees do not acquire language because they do not understand the meanings of signs, including words. A similar conclusion has been endorsed by Yang (2013) and Berwick and Chomsky (2019). On this sceptical conclusion, chimpanzees and bonobos can learn to manipulate word-like symbols for instrumental gains but cannot understand their meanings in the ways that humans do.  

In this talk, I argue that the sceptical view is motivated not by compelling empirical data, but by an elevated and seemingly misguided conception of what is required for knowing the meaning of a sign. I will argue that there are no compelling theoretical grounds on which to endorse the sceptical conclusion. I also propose a gradualistic account of what knowing the meaning of a sign consists in, which does not presuppose any syntactic competence. I will argue that this approach supports the development of a single account of knowledge of meaning that can be applied to studies of communication in humans, primates, dogs, and other species; and I will also sketch an account of the pragmatic framework within which intentional communication in humans, great apes, and dogs takes place.

I finish by concluding that the sceptical conclusion does not support an account of why chimpanzees fail to acquire language, and that an alternative explanation is needed.